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Key Messages
 ■ The rise of China in the world economy and its growing importance 
as investor in industrialised and developing countries has raised 
concerns of policy makers in some countries
 ■ Contrary to the trade situation between China and the US, trade 
between the euro area aggregate and China is almost balanced
 ■ On an individual country level, Germany, Ireland and Finland record 
trade surpluses with China
 ■ As trade between the euro area and China is balanced, there is no 
need for policy action to address any imbalance
 ■ However, European markets should only be opened for Chinese 
companies and investment if this is reciprocated
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Trade deficit with China –an issue for the euro area? 
Klaus Weyerstrass, Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS), Vienna, Austria.1 
Abstract 
The rise of China in the world economy and its growing importance as investor in 
industrialised and developing countries raised concerns of policy makers in some countries. 
The large deficit in the trade with China has caused the US government to increase tariffs on 
imports from China. Contrary to the situation regarding trade between China and the US, 
trade between the euro area aggregate and China is almost balanced, with a small deficit in 
trade with goods and a small surplus in the services balance of the euro area. On the 
individual country level, Germany, Ireland and Finland record trade surpluses with China. An 
econometric analysis identified domestic demand as the most important determinant of the 
trade balance between the euro area and China. Also revealed comparative advantages, the 
exchange rate between the euro and the renminbi as well as the stance of fiscal policies 
influence the trade balance. Since trade between the euro area and China is more or less 
balanced, there is no need for policy actions to address any imbalances. Furthermore, for 
open economies which many of the euro area countries are, openness to international trade 
is important. Thus, European policy makers are well advised to advocate free market 
access, but reciprocity is important. 
1 Should we worry about bilateral trade imbalances? 
One might argue that it is the overall trade balance of a country vis-à-vis the entire rest of the world 
that matters, and not bilateral balances with individual countries. However, it is exactly these 
bilateral trade balances that are lively debated in the political discussion. Some politicians and 
economists argue that large bilateral imbalances are the result of unfair trade policies, while others 
regard them simply as a reflection of countries’ macroeconomic conditions. Empirical findings (Cuñat 
and Zymek, 2019) show that a large part of bilateral trade balances can be explained by differences 
in countries’ expenditures and industrial structures. This study also suggests that asymmetric trade 
wedges such as trade barriers directed towards individual countries as opposed to all trading 
partners have very little impact on aggregate trade balances. Instead, the aggregate trade balance is 
primarily determined by macroeconomic factors such as country’s savings preferences and the world 
interest rate. Therefore, a country which reduces a specific bilateral trade deficit by raising import 
barriers on the respective trade partner is only likely to increase its deficits with other countries 
(Cuñat and Zymek, 2019). Furthermore, trade barriers are detrimental to the imposing country’s 
welfare. Notwithstanding these empirically supported arguments, political debates very often focus 
on bilateral trade imbalances. Therefore, if is worthwhile to look closer at the trade balance 
between the euro area and China in this Policy Brief. 
1 Comments by Michael Reiter (IHS) and by participants of the EconPol Annual Conference 2019 in Brussels, 
and here in particular by Giovanni Ferri (Universita di Roma Lumsa) are gratefully acknowledged. 
2 China’s current account balance overall and vis-à-vis the US 
In the recent decades, China reached sizeable surpluses in its international trade with goods (Figure 
1). Between 1990 and 2004, this trade surplus reached between 1% and 3% in relation to GDP 
(exceptions being the year 1993 with a trade deficit and the years 1996 and 1997 when the surplus 
reached almost 5% of GDP). Since 2005, China’s trade surplus soared, peaking at almost 9% in 
relation to GDP in 2016. In the recent past, the trade surplus declined, but in 2018 it still reached 
more than 4% in relation to GDP. 
Due to rising service imports, in particular related to tourism spending as the rising Chinese middle 
and upper class increasingly spends their vacations abroad, the overall current account surplus 
declined substantially. Also a decreasing trade surplus contributed to the steep decline of the 
current account balance from its peak of around 10% in relation to GDP in 2007 to virtually zero in 
2018. Regarding the rebalancing contribution of travel imports, on the basis of data from 
counterparty countries and a gravity equation, Wong (2017) finds that a significant amount of 
China’s travel spending in the period 2014 – 2016 could not be explained by economic 
fundamentals. The unexplained travel imports are inversely related to domestic growth and 
positively with expectations of a depreciation of the renminbi against the dollar. Wong (2017) 
concludes that these unexplained travel imports are less likely consumption expenditures for goods 
and services abroad than domestic residents’ acquisition of foreign financial assets. Adjusted for 
these potential disguised outflows, China’s current account balance could have been higher than 
reported by around 1% of GDP in 2015 and 2016, a period when the Chinese economy slowed 
noticeably as it shifted away from investment- to consumption-driven growth (Wong, 2017). 
Figure 1: Current account balance of China (% of China’s GDP) 
 
Note: Current account data were only available starting in 1997. 
Source: UNCTAD; own illustration 
As a result of the current account surpluses, over time China accumulated increasing foreign assets 
(Figure 2). While these assets peaked in relation to GDP at about 56% in 2008 and 2009 before 
declining to slightly below 30% in 2018, in absolute values China’s foreign assets reached in their 
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peak only in 2014, but at the end of 2018 they still amounted to about 4 trillion US dollar. China is 
increasingly using these assets for investments not only in foreign government securities, but also in 
high-tech companies in many industrialised countries. 
Figure 2: China’s net foreign assets 
 
Source: World Bank; own illustration 
In addition to investing in high-tech companies, the Chines government also started a huge 
infrastructure initiative, called the “Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)”).  The BRI is a global development 
strategy adopted by the Chinese government in 2013, involving infrastructure development and 
investments in 152 countries and international organizations in Asia, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, 
and the Americas. While governments in many countries view this initiative as an opportunity to 
improve their connectivity, others raise concerns. These concerns are related to the risk that 
developing countries might not be able to service BRI-related debt, that they might be left with 
stranded infrastructure, and that local communities and the environment could be harmed. 
Furthermore, some politicians and commentators are concerned that China might gain political 
influence in the recipient countries (World Bank, 2019). 
The increasing influence of China in the world economy raised concerns of some policy makers in 
other countries. This applies not least to the US. The administration of President Donald Trump 
viewed also the widening trade deficit of the US vis-à-vis China as problematic. As Figure 3 reveals, 
China’s surplus in trade with goods vis-à-vis the US has been hovering around 4% of China’s GDP 
since 2005. In 2018, the trade deficit made up around 2% of US GDP, and as the balance in trade in 
services reached just 0.2% of US GDP, also the current account deficit reached around 2% of US GDP 
(Figure 4). This imbalance in trade between the US and China was the main trigger of the ongoing 
trade disputes between the governments of these economies. In July 2018, the US government 
started to impose special tariffs on selected imports from China. Since then, both the US and China 
raised existing tariff rates and widened the scope of products to which special tariffs are applied. 
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Figure 3: Trade balance (goods) of China by region (% of China’s GDP) 
 
Source: UNCTAD; own illustration 
Figure 4: Current account balance between the US and China (% of US GDP) 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA); own illustration 
3 Current account between the euro area and China  
The rise of China in the world economy as well as the trade conflict between the US and China raises 
the question whether there pertain also large imbalances in the trade between the euro area and 
China, and whether there is any need for policy action on the European side. As is already visible in 
Figure 3 above, the euro area indeed has a deficit in the trade with China, but this deficit (or, as it is 
shown in the figure, China’s surplus) declined substantially in the recent past. 
Figure 5 shows that the euro area as a whole has a current account surplus vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world of around 3% of GDP. In trade with China, there is a deficit, but it amounts to just below 1% of 
euro area GDP. Figures 6 and 7 reveal that the euro area has a deficit in trade in goods vis-à-vis 
China, but a surplus in trade in services. With respect to the US, the euro area has a surplus in trade 
in goods, but a small deficit in trade in services. 
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Figure 5: Current account balance of the euro area (% of euro area GDP) 
 
Source: Eurostat; own illustration 
Figure 6: Balance of trade in goods of the euro area (% of euro area GDP) 
 
Source: Eurostat; own illustration 
Figure 7: Balance of trade in services of the euro area (% of euro area GDP) 
 
Source: Eurostat; own illustration 
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While detailed balance of payments data and data on trade in services are only available from 2008 
onwards, data on trade in goods is available for a longer period. Figure 8 shows that the trade deficit 
between the 19 countries currently forming the euro area and China widened steadily between 1995 
and 2008. With the Great Financial Crisis in 2009 and again during the euro area crisis of 2012 – 2013 
the trade deficit declined somewhat, then grew again, and in 2017 and 2018 the trade deficit 
stabilised at around 110 billion euro or 1% of euro area GDP.  
Figure 8: Trade balance (goods) of the euro area vis-à-vis China  
 
Source: Eurostat; own illustration 
Figure 9 shows to which extent the 19 member states contribute to the overall trade deficit of the 
euro area vis-à-vis China (124.4 billion euro in 2018). Both in absolute values (74.4 billion euro) and 
in relation to GDP (9.6%), the Netherlands have the largest deficit. Due to the sizes of their 
economies, Italy, Spain, France and Belgium have the next largest trade deficits. On the other hand, 
Germany, Finland and Ireland are the only euro area countries that recorded trade surpluses with 
China in 2018. In absolute values, Germany had the largest trade surplus (18 billion euro). In relation 
to GDP, the trade surpluses of Finland (0.6%) and Germany (0.5%) were of comparable magnitudes 
and slightly larger than that of Ireland (0.3%). 
The figure shows that by and large, trade between the aggregate euro area and China is more or less 
balanced. There is a deficit in trade in goods for all but three countries, but for most of them this 
deficit is far from dramatic. Only for the Netherlands the trade deficit exceeds 3% of its GDP, but the 
Dutch figures are biased due to the port of Rotterdam. While the goods entering the euro area via 
Rotterdam are statistically attributed to the Netherlands, most of them are destined for other 
countries. As the trade deficit of the Netherlands is distorted by country-specific features, the same 
is true for the trade surplus of Ireland. There many multilateral companies, especially from the US, 
have their European plants, and their exports add to the Irish trade surplus. 
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Figure 9: Trade balance (goods) of the euro area vis-à-vis China in 2018 
                 % of GDP (upper panel), billion euros (lower panel) 
 
 
Source: Eurostat; own illustration 
4 Determinants of the trade balance between the euro area and 
China 
4.1 Which determinants identifies the literature? 
The theoretical and empirical literature identifies several factors that determine the trade balance 
between countries. Based on econometric analyses of aggregate trade balances, sectoral 
expenditure and production shares as well as sector-level bilateral trade flows of 40 economies, 
Cuñat and Zymek (2019) find that bilateral trade balances can mainly be explained by bilateral trade-
wedges such as technological and policy barriers to trade as well as preference differences across 
countries. Other determinants are differences in production and expenditure patterns, while 
aggregate trade imbalances play a minor role. 
Analysing the current account development within the euro area, Belabed and Ramskogler (2019) 
find that the rebalancing in the euro area since the Great Financial Crisis was due to a reduction of 
the deficits by the deficit countries, while surplus countries maintained or even increased their 
surpluses. The main driver of the deficit reduction was the suppression of domestic demand. 
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In several analyses of the development and determinants of current accounts worldwide, the IMF 
(2018, 2019a, 2019b) identifies domestic demand, fiscal policies, exchange rate developments, and 
tariffs as well as other protectionist measures as drivers of current account balances. In this regard, 
the fiscal policy stance does not act as an independent driver, but through its influence on domestic 
demand. A fiscal loosening supports domestic demand and thus imports. Bilateral trade balances as 
the one between the US and China might be influenced by the overall trade balances of the 
respective countries. As an example, an expansionary fiscal policy in the US will probably lead to 
higher imports from the rest of the world, resulting in a deterioration of the overall trade balance as 
well as the constituting bilateral trade balances. On the contrary, trade policies which are directed 
only towards single countries affect bilateral trade balances asymmetrically. As an example, the 
tariffs which the US imposed on imports from China might divert Chinese exports towards other 
destinations such as the euro area. Thereby, tariffs between the US and China would influence the 
trade balance between the euro area and China. 
4.2 Own empirical investigation 
4.2.1 Data and method 
For the empirical investigation on the factors that influence the bilateral trade balance between the 
euro area and China, the following variables were used: 
− The dependent variable, i.e. the variable that was to be explained by the model, is the 
bilateral trade balance in trade with goods, in percent of the euro area’s GDP. Source: 
Eurostat. 
The following explanatory variables were tested and finally chosen: 
- Demand: different demand variables were tested: the level of domestic demand in the euro 
area and in China, and the output gap. For the euro area, the output gap estimated by the 
European Commission on the basis of a production function was taken. Since for China no 
such data was available, the output gap was simply calculated as the percentage deviation of 
actual from trend GDP, where the trend was extracted by applying the Hodrick Prescott filer. 
Data sources: euro area: Eurostat (demand), AMECO database (output gap); China: Demand 
and GDP: OECD, output gap: own calculation. 
- The nominal bilateral exchange rate between the euro and the Chinese renminbi. Also the 
real effective exchange rates of the euro area and of China were tested in the empirical 
applications, but they turned out not to be significant. This is probably related to the fact 
that the effective exchange rates include the development of the currencies (euro and 
renminbi) to several other countries of the world, while this analysis was only interested in 
the bilateral trade balance. Hence, it is not surprising that in this case the bilateral exchange 
rate between the two economies is more important than the exchange rate towards a large 
number of economies. Sources: Eurostat (from 2001 onwards); before 2001: Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis (US dollar / renminbi) and Bundesbank (D-Mark / US dollar and euro / US 
dollar). 
- Revealed comparative advantage (RCA). In this case, RCA is defined as the ratio of a 
country's exports of a certain good to the world's exports of that good, divided by that 
country's share of exports of manufactures in the world exports of manufactures. A value of 
the index above (below) one is interpreted as a revealed comparative advantage 
(disadvantage) for the particular good. The RCA is available on a more disaggregated level 
(e.g. for fuels, vegetables, manufactured goods), and on an aggregated level. For the current 
study, the RCA indices for the following aggregates were tested: consumer goods, 
intermediate goods, and capital goods. The RCA is published for pairs of countries. For the 
empirical investigation, the RCA between China and the euro area was thus calculated as the 
weighted average of the RCA between China and each euro area member state, where 
nominal GDP shares were used as the weights. Data source of the RCA: World Bank, World 
Integrated Trade Solution Database. 
- Tariff rates in China and in the euro area: applied rate weighted mean, all products. Source: 
World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
- Fiscal policy. An expansionary fiscal policy stance is associated with higher demand of which 
parts are imported, resulting ceteris paribus in a deterioration of the trade balance. The 
fiscal stance was approximated by the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB), since this 
indicator captures discretionary policy measures, but not cyclical influences on the fiscal 
balance. An expansionary fiscal policy in the euro area leads to a reduction in the CAPB and 
hence to an improvement of the trade balance. Similarly, an expansionary fiscal stance of 
China reduces the Chinese CAPB, leading to an improvement of the euro area trade balance. 
Sources: AMECO database for the euro area, IMF Fiscal Monitor for China. 
Annual data starting in 1995 were used. While most of the data are available until 2018, data on the 
revealed comparative advantage as well as the data on the average tariff rates were at the time of 
writing this policy brief only available until 2017. 
4.2.2 Results 
The results of the estimations are summarised in Table 1, while detailed results along with 
information on the statistical properties of the estimation can be found in Table 2 in the appendix. 
The most important influence on the trade balance was found to be domestic demand (measured 
via the output gap, i.e. the deviation of actual demand from its long-term trend), where an increase 
in demand in China raises imports and thus improves the bilateral trade balance of the euro area. 
Also a higher revealed comparative advantage of the euro area in the production of capital goods 
improves the euro area trade balance. The same is true if the euro area conducts a more restrictive 
fiscal policy than China, shown as an increase of the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance in 
the euro relative to that of China. On the other hand, a higher revealed comparative advantage of 
China in the production of intermediate goods as well as tariffs on Chinese imports leads to a 
deterioration of the euro area trade balance. A negative influence of China’s tariffs on the trade 
balance between the euro area and China could only be detected from 2004 onwards, since in the 
period before that year, the rapid integration of China into the world economy led to an increase of 
the euro area trade balance with China, while at the same time China considerably reduced its 
import tariffs. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Determinants of trade balance between the euro area and China – overview 
Variable Influence 
Output gap in China ++ 
CAPB euro area – CAPB China ++ 
Average tariff in China (from 2004 onwards) --- 
RCA of China (intermediate goods) --- 
RCA of the euro area (capital goods) +++ 
Exchange rate renminbi / euro - 
Note: + (-),++ (--),+++ (---): positive (negative) influence at the 10, 5, 1 percent level of significance. 
5 Summary and policy conclusions 
The rise of China as a player in the world economy together with its growing importance as an 
investor in industrialised and developing countries raised concerns of policy makers in some 
countries. The large deficit in the trade with China has caused the US government to impose 
additional tariffs on imports from China. Trade between the euro area aggregate and China is almost 
balanced, with a small deficit in trade with goods and an also small surplus in the services balance of 
the euro area. On the individual country level, Germany, Ireland and Finland record trade surpluses 
with China, while the other countries have deficits. An econometric analysis of the determinants of 
the bilateral trade balance between the euro area aggregate and China identified domestic demand 
as the most important factor. Also revealed comparative advantages, the exchange rate between 
the euro and the renminbi as well as the stance of fiscal policies influence the trade balance. Since 
trade between the euro area and China is more or less balanced, there is no need for policy actions 
to address any imbalances. Furthermore, for open economies - which many of the euro area 
countries are - openness to international trade is an important positive determinant of welfare. 
Thus, European policy makers are well advice to advocate free market access. However, reciprocity 
is an important issue. Hence, European markets should only be opened for Chinese companies and 
investment insofar as also the Chinese market is open for European companies.  
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Appendix 
Table 2: Determinants of trade balance between the euro area and China – detailed results 
Variable Coefficient 
(absolute t-statistics) 
Constant 0.249        (0.639) 
Output gap in China 0.099**        (2.685) 
CAPB euro area – CAPB China 0.033**        (2.128) 
Average tariff in China (from 2004 onwards) -0.064***      (5.565) 
RCA of China (intermediate goods) -3.145***      (4.217) 
RCA of the euro area (capital goods) 0.803***      (6.640) 
Exchange rate renminbi / euro -0.036*       (1.718) 
Dummy for the year 2015 -0.177*       (1.943) 
Adjusted R²: 0.949 
Number of observations: 22 (1996 – 2017) 
 
Note: *, **, ***: significant on the 10, 5, 1 level 
Source: own estimation 
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